Can Cash Be a Ventilator for Firms Suffering from COVID-19? Evidence from Stock Market in Japan by 青野 幸平 & 堀 敬一
Can Cash Be a Ventilator for Firms Suffering














Discussion paper No. 214 
 
Can Cash Be a Ventilator for Firms Suffering from COVID-19? 
Evidence from Stock Market in Japan 
 
 
Kohei Aono  
(College of Economics, Ritsumeikan University) 
 
Keiichi Hori  












SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY 
 
1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho 
Nishinomiya 662-8501, Japan 
Can Cash Be a Ventilator for Firms
Suffering from COVID-19?
Evidence from Stock Market in Japan∗
Kohei Aono†and Keiichi Hori‡
May 17, 2020
Abstract
This paper explores how cash can mitigate adverse COVID-19 shocks to firms
using an event-study methodology and the financial data from firms listed on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. We find that firms with more cash, less debt, and
larger scale suffered less from the pandemic during the entire event window. We
also find that the pandemic reduced the value of future investment opportunities
the firms might invest in. Finally, we show that the variations in stock returns
reflecting firm-specific factors become relatively smaller than that induced by
market returns as cash holdings increase.
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In the absence of frictions in financial markets, cash in normal times does not contribute
to firm value. However, in an emergency, such as when a firm faces an unexpected ad-
verse shock, cash can support a firm’s value. In many cases under such an environment,
firms find it difficult to raise external funding, so the more cash they hold, the more
likely they are to survive because they can pay off their debts and pay their workers.
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic continues to have negative impacts not only on
people’s health but also on the economy. The total number of COVID-19 infections in
Japan has increased rapidly since the beginning of March (Figure 1) As with the rest
of the world, Japan’s stock prices plummeted as the negative impact of COVID-19 on
the economy became apparent; e.g., the TOPIX index fell about 500 points in a month
from about 1,700 in early February. This was the first decline since October 2008, when
the global financial crisis hit the economy.
This paper explores how cash saved firms suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic by
investigating stock price reactions to the pandemic. Firms can reserve their cash either
for investment in profitable projects that have not been implemented or for payment
of their debts that are coming due when they face a cash-flow shortfall. We argue that
cash holdings enabled firms to mitigate adverse shocks to their stock prices. We also
find that it allowed them to maintain the value of their investment opportunities. To
test these hypotheses, we use an event-study methodology and the financial data from
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
As an event, the COVID-19 pandemic has several features. First, the COVID-19
outbreak was exogenous, unpredictable, and spread rapidly throughout the world in a
short period of time. Second, during the early stages of the outbreak, investors were
likely to be unaware that it would become a pandemic and have a significant nega-
tive impact on the economy because our knowledge of COVID-19 is limited. Thus,
the COVID-19 pandemic has specific advantages and disadvantages compared with the
economic shocks typically considered in the literature. The COVID-19 shock serves as
an ideal setting to test the causal link between corporate cash holdings and asset prices
because the event was exogenous and unpredictable. Using the pandemic as the event,
we can rule out the issue of endogeneity that the firms may change their cash holdings
because of large stock price fluctuations. Confounding events can be ignored because
the outbreak of an infectious disease is an independent event. These are the advan-
tages. However, it is difficult for us to determine the event date and window exactly
because we knew little about the virus in the early stage of the pandemic and it is an
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ongoing event. Even if we exclude the impact of the market returns, the covariance of
the abnormal returns across firms may not be zero because the event date is common
to all firms. Those are the disadvantages.
Taking the advantages and overcoming the disadvantages of the COVID-19 pandemic
as the event, we empirically analyze the role of cash in mitigating adverse shocks to
stock prices. Following the standard procedure for event studies, we identified the event
date, the event window, and the estimation window. As it is difficult to identify a single
event date for the COVID-19 pandemic, we selected two event dates, January 30 and
March 2. On the first event date, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a
“Public Health Emergency of International Concern,” and the Governor of the Bank
of Japan issued an emergency statement on the second event date. The event windows
run from each event date to April 30. The estimation window run from January 4 to
December 30 in 2019. We then use the data for the estimation window to estimate
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and then use the estimated parameters to
calculate the abnormal returns for the event window. From the abnormal returns, the
cumulative abnormal returns are calculated, and we find that the pandemic had a neg-
ative impact on stock prices. We consider the role of cash by regressing the cumulative
abnormal returns on the cash holding ratio and other variables representing firm at-
tributes. Finally, some further analyses are performed.
Our empirical findings are as follows. First, we find a positive relation between cash
holdings and abnormal returns for Japanese firms over the period from January 30 to
April 30, which implies that cash holdings enable firms to mitigate the adverse shock to
their stock price. The result is robust to alternative specifications for regression equa-
tions. The same result is observed over the period from March 2 to April 30. However,
cash did not have an effect if the event window is limited to the period from January
30 to February 28.
Second, we also show that the pandemic reduced the value of future investment oppor-
tunities gauged by the market-to-book ratio. We do not find any significantly positive
relation between the market-to-book ratio and the abnormal returns, suggesting that
firms with a higher ratio experienced large drops in their stock prices. Combining the
second finding with the first one offers an interesting insight: e.g., for some time after
the COVID-19 outbreak occurred, investors understood that it would have a negative
impact only on some firms. In particular, it would be difficult for firms with valu-
able investment opportunities to undertake these investments. But as the COVID-19
outbreak spread, investors changed their perceptions toward the outbreak causing an
economy-wide negative cash flow shock.
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Third, we find that the variations in stock returns reflecting firm-specific factors be-
come relatively smaller as cash holdings increase. Variations in returns on each stock
can be divided into those driven by common risk factors reflected in the market returns
and those reflecting firm-specific factors. As the pandemic is a global event rather than
a firm-specific event, the pandemic affects stock returns not only through firm-specific
factors, but also through the market stock returns. We explore how much of the ob-
served variation in the stock returns for each firm can be explained by the variation
in the firm-specific factors and by the variation in the market returns. That finding is
consistent with our first finding because firms with more cash can mitigate the effects of
the adverse shock on their stock prices, resulting in less variation reflecting firm-specific
factors.
Our paper relates to the recent literature on corporate liquidity management poli-
cies. As the literature on corporate liquidity management including cash holdings is
extremely broad, we only present a brief discussion here1. If financial markets are per-
fect, the firms’ liquidity decision is irrelevant to their firm value. But when firms face
frictions in financial markets, it is worth exploring the optimal cash holding for firms.
This literature has developed in two main directions.2 The first direction relates to
the “precautionary demand for cash”; i.e., cash holdings are effective as a precaution-
ary hedge against the possibility that capital market frictions prevent the firms from
obtaining external financing. The second direction is “cash holdings from an agency
perspective.” According to this argument, managers hold cash for greater discretion in
management or for private benefit. Many empirical studies provide evidence of the
benefits to firms of holding cash to hedge against uncertainty. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz
(2009) find a growing demand for liquidity to buffer cash flow shocks as the reason
for the increase in cash held by US firms. In other words, holding cash allows firms
to maintain financial flexibility and minimize the damage of financial distress caused
by adverse cash flow shocks. Holding cash also allows firms to quickly accept projects
that have a positive net present value. For example, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach
(2004) develop a model that provides empirical evidence showing financially constrained
firms hold more cash than unconstrained firms, which suggests that firms hold more
cash for investment. Duong et al. (2020) find that US firms increase their cash holdings
in response to greater economic policy uncertainty.
1See Almeida et al. (2014) for a survey of the literature.
2Theories of liquidity management such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Tirole (2006), e.g.,
provide a unifying framework to help understand the main results of the literature for liquidity man-
agement, and show that information asymmetries between management and capital markets make
liquidity valuable.
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The 2007–2009 global financial crisis highlighted the role of cash held by firms. Sev-
eral studies have explored how the crisis has changed the management policies of firms.
For example, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) find that US firms ran out of cash dur-
ing the crisis and that investment after the crisis is positively related to cash reserves.
In addition, Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) show that firms tend to postpone
or suspend their investment plans when capital markets are tightened. COVID-19 is
the first major adverse shock to the global economy since the global financial crisis.
However, the two are different in terms of the nature of the event: i.e., the financial cri-
sis was a negative shock to external funding provided by financial institutions, whereas
COVID-19 was an exogenous shock unrelated to financial institutions.
Our event-study methodology follows Faulkender and Wang (2006), and Wagner,
Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018). Faulkender and Wang (2006) study the cross-sectional
variation in the marginal value of firms’ cash holdings resulting from different corporate
monetary policies. What they have in common with our study is that they regress the
excess returns, which are constructed by subtracting the benchmark returns from the
observed returns, on various variables, including cash. However, the difference is that
they do not determine a specific event date, but instead view any unexpected change in
cash holdings as an event. Another difference is that while the events considered in their
study are firm-specific, the event examined in our study is common to all firms. Many
of the events covered in the event studies are firm-specific; thus, the event dates differ
for different firms. However, several recent event studies considered political events and
ensured event days are common across all firms. For example, Wagner, Zeckhauser, and
Ziegler (2018) investigate stock market reactions to the outcome of the election for the
45th President of the United States of America and find evidence that a cross-section
of stock returns after the election reflects expectations of a major corporate tax reduc-
tion.3
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, this is an early
economic analysis of the effects of COVID-19 implemented using observed data. As
COVID-19 is an ongoing event, some economic impacts may be yet unknown. How-
ever, stock market data can provide a sense of how investors understood the event and
we can derive some policy implications from our results for the issues that currently
need to be resolved. Second, because the COVID-19 outbreak is an exogenous event,
3Liu, Shu, and Wei (2017) also investigate this issue through the impact of political uncertainty on
asset prices using the Bo Xilai political scandal in 2012 in China as an exogenous shock event and find
that the scandal caused a significant drop in stock prices, especially for firms that are more politically
sensitive.
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the effect of cash on firm value can be measured without concern about endogeneity.
Third, when an event affects stock returns through both common risk factors and firm-
specific factors, we propose a simple statistic that measures the relative influence of
firm-specific factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes some key
events related to COVID-19 in Japan. Section 3 explains hypothesis development and
Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and data. Section 5 reports the empirical
results and Section 6 considers further research issues. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Key Events Linked to COVID-19 in Japan
This section describes some key events linked to COVID-19 in Japan. Table 1 provides
a timeline of the major events.
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) confirmed the first infected
person in Japan on January 15. Although the number of patients in Japan was limited
until February, the number of infections has increased rapidly since the beginning of
March. The number of deaths has continued to rise since the first was reported on
February 13.
On February 1, the Japanese Government stepped up preventive measures against
COVID-19 by classifying it as a legally designated infectious disease. In the case of
severe infection, the government can legally order infected patients to be placed in a
hospital and impose restrictions on their work activities to prevent further virus out-
break. Furthermore, on February 25, the MHLW announced its “Basic Policies for Novel
Coronavirus Disease Control,” which summarizes the measures that are currently being
taken and some possible future measures that may be taken.
Despite all the measures taken, the number of COVID-19 patients kept surging
throughout March (Figure 1). Following the Diet’s approval of legislation authoriz-
ing Prime Minister Abe to declare a state of emergency, the Prime Minister declared a
state of emergency covering Tokyo, Osaka, and five other prefectures on April 7.4 Under
a state of emergency, the prefectural governor may require residents to stay indoors.5 It
would also allow for the expropriation of land for the construction of temporary medical
4The Government defines a state of emergency as “a situation in which the capacity to provide
medical care will reach its limit and people’s lives and health will be put at risk unless measures are
taken.”
5They may also call for the temporary closure or curtailment of schools and other public facilities.
If such a facility does not respond to a request, the prefecture will be able to publish the name of the
facility to ensure that measures are implemented.
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facilities to treat the rapidly growing number of patients. The provision allows suppliers
of medicines and food to order the sale to the authorities or to forcefully procure goods
from companies that refuse to do so. On April 16, the Prime Minister expanded the
state of emergency to cover the entire country. This policy revision reflected continued
growth in the number of infections in Japan in April and an understanding that efforts
to contain the virus were needed at the national level.
While the number of COVID-19 infections was limited in January and February,
the Japanese economy began to suffer. This was partly because Japanese firms were
forced to suspend operations in China. Another reason is that the Chinese government
prohibited all outbound group travel, which resulted in sharp declines in profits for
Japan’s retail and tourism sectors. As a result, a firm filed for bankruptcy on February
25, which marks the first business failure in Japan linked to the COVID-19 outbreak.
Since March, the virus has had a serious negative impact on the Japanese economy.
For example, some Japanese automakers have been forced to close some of their plants
and change their production plans. The consumer confidence survey carried out by the
Cabinet Office reported that the Consumer Confidence Index in March 2020 was 30.9,
down 7.4 points from the previous month.
To mitigate the adverse economic impact of COVID-19, the Prime Minister pledged
to implement emergency spending packages. The first round of measures disbursed
Y15.3 billion in early February and the second one Y270 billion in early March. These
measures included employment subsidies and zero-interest loans without collateral to
small and mid-sized companies. On April 7, the Government announced its “Emergency
Economic Measures for Response to COVID-19” stimulus package worth 108 trillion
yen, which is equivalent to 20% of Japan’s GDP. The package allows a one-year tax
moratorium worth Y26 trillion and spends Y6 trillion on cash grants for affected small
and midsize companies, and households in need. It also includes interest-free unsecured
loans and allows recurring debts to be refinanced as interest-free loans.
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) also stepped up its quantitative and qualitative monetary
easing policy. On March 2, the Governor of the BOJ issued an emergency statement
and pledged that the BOJ would strive to provide ample liquidity and ensure stability
in financial markets through appropriate market operations and asset purchases.6
6The BOJ has offered to buy 500 billion yen ($4.6 billion) of government bonds in a repurchase
agreement to provide liquidity to market participants. Furthermore, on March 16, the BOJ pledged
to buy exchange-traded funds and other risky assets at twice the current pace.
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3 Hypothesis Development
The theory of optimal firm cash holdings predicts that a role of cash is a precautionary
hedge against adverse shocks. In the presence of an unexpected shock, firms would use
their cash reserves to mitigate a decline in cash flow because raising funds externally
in such a situation would be costly or impossible. If the firms run out of cash or
are unable to raise external funds, they will be forced to sell their essential assets or
liquidate, resulting in a significant decline in their firm values. The widely accepted
conclusion of the literature is that cash remains the best instrument for certain groups
of firms even if other options such as debt capacity, derivatives, and lines of credit are
also available.7 Given the impact of COVID-19 on the economy, we expect that the
stock prices of firms with more cash did not fall as much as those of firms with less
cash.
(H1) The more cash a firm holds, the less impact COVID-19 had on its stock price.
Firms facing financial frictions incur higher costs in raising external funding. Firms
with investment opportunities are therefore more likely to abandon these valuable
projects if the cost of raising external funding is high and internal funding is insuf-
ficient. A large literature begun by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) provides
evidence in support of this hypothesis. Moreover, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach
(2004) show that financially constrained firms systematically save cash from their cash
flow, while unconstrained firms do not. Based on these results, Acharya, Almeida, and
Campello (2007) categorized constrained firms based on the correlation between cash
flow and investment opportunities. They show that when investment opportunities
arise when operating cash flow is relatively low, financially constrained firms save cash
rather than pay down debt. However, unconstrained firms and constrained firms with a
high correlation between investment opportunities and high cash flows pay down debt
rather than save cash. Some studies such as Sufi (2009), Campello, Graham, and Har-
vey (2010) and Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) find that lines of credit and cash are
used for different purposes.8 They show that nonoperational cash guards against future
cash flow shocks in bad times, while credit lines give firms the option to exploit future
investment opportunities available in good times. In Japan, Sasaki (2016) shows that
the motivation of firms for holding excess cash is not only to prepare for future cash
7See Almeida et al. (2014).
8Lines of credit are also sources of liquidity, but this paper focuses its analysis solely on cash. This
is because it is not possible to obtain the information on lines of credit for all firms, as even publicly
traded companies are not required to disclose information on lines of credit agreements.
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flow shortfalls, but also to prepare for future investment opportunities that have not
been implemented. This argument motivates our second hypothesis:
(H2) The more cash a firm holds, the less impact COVID-19 had on the value of its
investment opportunities.
4 Empirical Strategy and Data
To investigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic as an unexpected adverse shock
to Japanese firms, we use the event-study methodology suggested by Campbell, Lo, and
MacKinlay (1997) to measure the decline in market value of firms listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, which is an estimate of the market’s valuation of the impact of the
pandemic on the firms’ value. The procedure for the analysis is as follows. First, the
event date is identified. Then, we determine on the event window. Finally, abnormal
returns are calculated based on the CAPM.
4.1 Event Date
The COVID-19 pandemic as an event has unique several features compared with the
events that the literature typically considers. First, the outbreak of COVID-19 was
exogenous, unpredictable, and spread rapidly throughout the world in a short period
of time.
Second, because we know very little about COVID-19, the uncertainty of its impact
on the economy is high. It is believed to be the first major pandemic since the Spanish
Flu in 1918. The WHO certified the 2009 Swine Flu as a pandemic, but governments at
that time did not implement measures such as voluntary restraints on overseas travel,
border closures, or even lockdowns of major cities. Therefore, it is difficult to predict
the impact of a pandemic on the economy based on past experiences.
We adopt two event days in our analysis because the above characteristics lead us to
the difficulty of limiting the event date to a specific single day.9 The first event date
is January 30, when the WHO declared a “Public Health Emergency of International
Concern” by acknowledging the outbreak of COVID-19 as a serious event endangering
international public health. At that point, however, investors may not have been aware
that COVID-19 would have a negative impact on the economy. The second event date
is March 2, the day the Governor of the BOJ issued an emergency statement informing
that it might pursue a further easing of monetary policy. The emergency economic
9In Appendix, we provide other evidence we used to determine the event date.
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measures themselves could have a positive impact on stock prices. However, Japan
has not had any experience in implementing economic policies on the grounds of infec-
tious diseases since World War II, which suggests that COVID-19 is an unprecedented
infectious disease and could have a negative impact on stock prices.
4.2 Event Window
We analyze three different sets of cumulative abnormal returns: the first from January
30 to the end of April, the second from March 2 to the end of April, and the third from
January 30 to February 26. 10 The first set corresponds to the first event date. How
the market was digesting information about the impact of COVID-19 on the economy
over time can be understood by analyzing the cumulative abnormal returns over this
period. The second set corresponds to the second event date. Since the second event
day, investors may have been aware of the coming recession. Thus, the impact of
the coming recession on stock prices can be understood by analyzing the cumulative
abnormal returns over this period. For both sets, the last day of the event window is
April 30. While this choice for the end point is somewhat arbitrary, the pandemic is an
ongoing event, so it makes sense to use as much of the available data as possible. To
confirm the robustness of the estimated results, we analyze the impact of COVID-19
on stock prices using the cumulative abnormal returns from January 30 to February
26. Between the first event date and the second event date, COVID-19 may have been
perceived as serious, but not a disease that would negatively affect the economy. If
such a perception existed, the negative shocks to the economy would be temporary and
small in magnitude; thus, cash would play a limited role in mitigating the decline in
stock prices.
4.3 Abnormal Returns
To measure stock market reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic, we calculate abnormal
returns using the CAPM.
Rit − Rft = αi + βi(Rmt − Rft) + ϵit (1)
where Rit is the return for firm i on date t , Rft is the risk-free rate on date t, Rmt is
the market return on date t, αi is a constant for firm i, βi is the beta for firm i, and ϵit
10Note that the method of identifying the event window in this paper follows that adopted by Wagner
(2018). Typically, the event window in this paper is set for a certain period of time before or after the
event date, whereas Wagner (2018) only sets the event window for a certain period of time after the
event.
10
is an error term with mean 0 and variance σ2ϵi .
We estimate βi in equation (1) for each firm i using ordinary least squares (OLS) for
the period from January 4, 2019 to December 30, 2019 (estimation window). We then
compute the abnormal return for firm i on date t, ARit, after January 6, 2020, the next
business day following the last day of the estimation window. To this end, we subtract
the normal return, NRit, from daily excess returns on each stock where NRit is defined
as follows.
NRit = α̂i + β̂i(Rmt − Rft) + Rft (2)
α̂i is the estimated αi and β̂i is that of βi in equation (1), respectively. The cumulative





where CARi(T1, T2) is the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i from T1 to T2, T1 is
the first day of the event window and T2 is the last day of it.
4.4 Empirical Design
To evaluate the effect of cash holdings on staving off a stock price decline, we regress
CAR on a variable representing firms’ cash holdings (Cash), the other firm-specific
characteristics, and industry dummy variables. The cash variable is calculated by di-
viding “cash and deposits” on the balance sheet by “total assets.” To test hypothesis
H1, we examine the coefficient of cash. If it is positive, the empirical result is consistent
with H1.
Control variables include the market-to-book ratio of the firm (MB), cash flow (CF ),
firm leverage (Leverage), short-term debt ratio (Short), and total assets (Size). MB is
measured by the ratio of the market value of the firm’s total assets to their book value,
where the market value of the firm’s total assets is calculated by evaluating only the
value of common stock minus treasury stock at the firm’s stock price on December 30,
2019. CF is the cash-flow-to-assets ratio, measured as the cash flow over total assets.
Leverage is defined as the ratio of “total liabilities” to total assets. Short is defined as
total amount of borrowings from financial institutions and corporate bonds due within
one year divided by total liabilities. Size is the logarithm of total assets.
To test hypothesis H2, we add the interaction term of Cash and MB (Cash* MB)
as an explanatory variable. The coefficient on the interaction term reflects the Cash-
dependent effect in the sensitivity, which measures the extent to which a firm’s stock
price after the event date reacts to the value of the firm at the end of 2019. An estimated
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positive coefficient of the interaction term would be evidence in support of hypothesis
H2.
4.5 Data
The sample for this paper includes firms listed on the first and second sections, and the
Mothers market of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, excluding the financial and insurance
sectors. We also exclude firms from our sample if their stocks were not traded for even
one business day in 2019. After applying these filters, we have a sample of 2468 firms,
but then drop firms whose cash flow data are not reported when it is used as a control
variable.
The stock and financial data, except the risk-free rate, are taken from Nikkei Financial-
Quest. The stock prices are adjusted for splits and net dividends. The risk-free rate is
the interest rate on Japanese government bonds with a 10-year maturity.11 All rates of
return are translated on a daily basis. We use the most current accounting data as of
December 30, 2019 for all firms.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper. The cross-
sectional mean of CAR over the entire period is −0.0437. Therefore, it can be said that
COVID-19 has negative impacts on stock prices on average. However, the results are
different between the early period (from January 30 to February 28) and the middle–
late period (from March 2 to April 30). While the mean CAR for the early period
is negative, it is positive for the middle–late period, which means that the negative
impacts on stock prices are severe for the early period and are mild for the middle–late
period. Note that raw returns during the middle–late period are not necessarily positive
because CARs in this paper are calculated excluding the factor that correlates with the
market return.
According to Surveys for the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by In-
dustry conducted by the Ministry of Finance in Japan, cash and deposits account for
about 12% of total assets for all industries except finance and insurance. The average
for Cash in this paper is 23%, which is considerably larger than that ratio. This reflects
the large values of Cash in relatively small firms because it is a simple mean.12
11The risk-free rate is taken from the website of Ministry of Finance, Japan, see
https://www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/reference/interest rate/index.htm




Figure 2 plots univariate comparisons of average cumulative standardized abnormal
returns (CSAR) after January 6, 2020, the business day following the last day of the
estimation window.13 Here, the quintile is sorted based on Cash. The figure presents
the average CSAR for Category 1 as the first quintile (the cash-richest group), Category
5 as the fifth quintile (the cash-poorest group), and all firms. The outbreak of COVID-
19 was evident in January, but it was not until mid-February that stocks plummeted.
This result suggests that the markets needed about two weeks to digest the information
associated with the outbreak and the economy. This figure also shows that there has
been substantial variation in the way the stock prices of companies with different cash
holdings have reacted. The Category 1 CSAR was positive until mid-January, whereas
the Category 5 CSAR has remained negative since the beginning of January. It is worth
noting that in February, the Category 1 CSAR was significantly below the Category
5 CSAR. By mid-March, the CSAR was trending upward, but the Category 1 CSAR
was still below the Category 5 CSAR. The variations of CSAR for the two groups are
particularly striking and counterintuitive, which might not be consistent with H1. We
will discuss this issue in Section 5.2 when we examine the results of the regression
analysis.
5.2 Results from Regression Analysis
This section investigates the cross-section of stock price responses to the COVID-19
pandemic using regression analysis. We examine whether cash holdings affected the
cross-section of stock returns, over the entire period (from January 30 to April 30),
over the middle–late period, and over the early period. Table 3 presents the empirical
results of regressions of individual CARs on Cash and the control variables for the
entire period. In addition to MB, CF, Leverage, Short, Size, and Cash* MB, the
control variables include industry dummies and interaction terms of industry dummies
and Cash. All specifications are estimated by OLS.
The estimated coefficients of cash are significantly positive at the 1% level in all but
one case (result in column (9)), which implies that cash-rich firms are fairly valued, all
13Cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CSAR) for firm i are defined as
CARi(T1, T2)/σi(T1, T2), where σi(T1, T2) is the standard deviation of CAR for firm i between
T1 and T2.
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other things being equal. These results are consistent with H1, but not with the result
from the univariate analysis. The reason why the results of the regression analysis
differ from those of the univariate analysis is that the univariate analysis includes the
industry-specific factors. Note that the explanatory variables in some equations include
interaction terms for cash and industry dummies. The estimates of the coefficients of
Cash are those for the benchmark industry (here, the services industry), an industry
for which the industry dummy variable does not equal one, thus the estimates of these
coefficients are not significantly positive for all industries. Still, about 20% of firms
belong to industries for which the estimates are significantly negative, which does not
significantly change our argument.14
Cash may be regarded as a measure of the difficulty of obtaining external financing
rather than a measure of excess funds. This is because the more difficult it is to raise
external funding in the face of a negative cash flow shock, the stronger the precautionary
demand for cash will be. However, that interpretation is unlikely to be applicable to
our results. The reason for this is that, if that interpretation is correct, we would expect
the estimated coefficients on Cash to be insignificant. When a firm needs funds in an
emergency, those with a substantial amount of cash will fund their operations with cash
on hand, whereas those with little cash will need to raise money externally. Therefore,
it should have no impact on CAR at all, as both types of firms can obtain the necessary
funds. However, Table 3 presents no such evidence, with one exception. In other words,
Cash should be interpreted as an index of excess funds.
The majority of the estimated coefficients of MB are insignificant. The exception is a
result in column (7) in which estimated coefficients of MB is significantly negative at the
10% level. MB is a variable that represents the investment opportunities of a firm. If
the pandemic caused firms to lose their investment opportunities, the firms with larger
MB should experience more severe stock price drops. Therefore, the insignificance
of the coefficient on MB means that stock prices fell uniformly amid the pandemic,
regardless of the investment opportunities of the firm.
The estimated coefficients of CF are all insignificant. If the estimated coefficients
on cash flow were positive, firms that performed well before the COVID-19 outbreak
would have been able to stave off a decline in their stock price because they would have
been expected to perform relatively well after the outbreak. However, such an effect is
not observed here.
The estimated coefficients of Leverage are significantly negative in all cases. The
14The industries where the estimates are significantly negative are Food, Other Manufacturing,
Construction, Trading, Retail, Air Transportation, and Electric Power. See Appendix A.2 for details.
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common intuition about the coefficient for Leverage is that firms with higher leverage
are riskier, which means that they have a higher probability of default. In the presence
of default, the firms are forced to sell their essential assets and incur the cost of an
inefficient liquidation. Our results are consistent with this intuition because the stock
price of such firms with a high probability of default are undervalued in the market.
The absolute values of the estimated coefficients for Leverage are smaller than those of
Cash, which provides the following insight. Let us assume that a firm issues additional
debt and all the funds raised are held in cash, making the firm’s Leverage and Cash
both increase by one point. According to the estimates in column (13), the impact
on CAR is different between Leverage and Cash. A one percentage point increase in
Leverage lowers CAR by 17 basis points, while a one percentage point increase in Cash
raises CAR by 21 basis points. In other words, it would be more valuable to increase
cash holdings by one dollar than to reduce debt by one dollar; thus, cash is not negative
debt in an emergency. This result is consistent with Acharya, Almeida, and Campello
(2007), who show that financially constrained firms prefer more cash to less debt if their
hedging needs are high.
The estimated coefficients of Short are negative in all cases, but only two cases are
significant. Short is a variable that indicates the need for funds within one year. Our
results are not robust, but are consistent with the theory of refinancing risk; i.e., firms
with more short-term debt have a higher risk of refinancing and a higher likelihood of
failure.15
Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), Size is added as a control variable.16 Larger
firms are considered to be better known to investors and have better access to capital
markets than smaller firms. Therefore, they have fewer constraints on raising funds for
investment. It is also believed that there are economies of scale in liquidity management,
and, given that the other conditions are equal, the larger firms can save more cash and
its equivalent. The estimated coefficients of Size are significantly positive in all cases,
which provides evidence in support of those hypotheses.
We find that the estimated coefficient of Cash* MB is not significant, suggesting that
the hypothesis H2 is not supported. Even when this interaction term is added as an
explanatory variable, the estimates of the coefficients in column (13) are very similar
to the estimates in column (12). Thus, we find that stock prices fell uniformly with or
15Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) find that firms can reduce refinancing risk by increasing their
cash holdings and saving cash from cashflow. Even if a firm cannot refinance, cash holdings makes its
likelihood of failure smaller.
16We use total assets for Size, whereas Faulkender and Wang (2006) use sales.
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without investment opportunities at the end of last year, and do not observe that cash
holdings prevented the loss of those investment opportunities.
Table 4 shows the empirical results of regressions for the middle–late period, using
the same specifications as those for the entire period. The results are similar to those
for the entire period.17 The one exception is that the estimated coefficients of Size are
significantly negative here, whereas they are significantly positive for the entire period.
One interpretation of the similarity between the results in Tables 3 and 4 is that the
shocks that occurred on the event days had a similar impact on the economy, although
the event days were different between them. However, the spread of the COVID-19 is
an ongoing event; i.e., as of January 30, investors may not yet have been able to fully
digest all of the related information. This suggests that the results for the entire period
strongly reflect the results for the middle–late period, even though they had different
impacts on the economy. To see which interpretation is more plausible, we performed
the same regression analysis for the early period, from January 30 to February 28.
Table 5 shows the empirical results of the regressions for the early period, with the
same specifications as before. A difference from previous results is that more than half
of the estimates of the coefficients for Cash are not significant and one coefficient is
negative, making these empirical results for the early period not robust.18
The estimated coefficients of MB are all negative, although only two of the four
cases are significant. This suggests that the greater the growth opportunities firms
had prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the lower their stock prices fell in February. In
other words, the market interpreted the economic impact of COVID-19 as the loss of
a potential investment opportunity that firms had held at that time. Cash* MB is
added as an explanatory variable to the equation in column (12), and the estimation
results are presented in column (13). Not only is the coefficient of this interaction term
not significant, but the coefficients of Cash and MB, which were significant in column
(12), are no longer significant in column (13). The reason for this is as follows. We
find that the correlation coefficient between Cash and the interaction term is 0.515
and that between MB and the interaction term is 0.927, which means that MB and
the interaction term vary in almost exactly same way. It is likely that this very high
correlation caused the explanatory power of each explanatory variable to disappear in
the regression analysis.
17The industries with the significantly negative estimates for Cash are Food, Pulp, Other Manufac-
turing, Construction, Trading, Retail, Air Transportation, and Telecommunication. See Appendix A.2
for this issue.
18The industries with the significantly negative estimates for Cash are Medicine, Rubber, Trading,
and Electric Power. See Appendix A.2 for this issue.
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Table 6 shows the results of regressing MB on Cash, which indicate that the more
cash that a firm holds, the higher the stock market valuation of the firm. This result
has the following implications for firms’ cash holdings. Firms did not hold cash as ”free
cash flow” for managers to make inefficient investments discussed by Jensen (1986).
Our understanding is consistent with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) who show that
firms facing greater uncertainty could have more cash holdings in the case of less agency
conflicts between managers and shareholders.19
It is also likely that the purpose of holding large amounts of cash was to prepare for
investments in high-value projects that might occur in the future. Let us assume that
all of a firm’s cash holdings were based on a precautionary demand against a negative
cash flow shock. If this hypothesis is correct, following an unexpected negative cash flow
shock because of COVID-19, the firm’s value should not decline significantly because
the firm can hedge that shock using the cash it holds. In this case, it is expected that
the regression analysis in this paper will give positive estimates of the coefficients of
MB, but the estimates we obtain here are different. That is, while all firms held cash
based on preliminary demands to hedge negative cash flow risk, we can determine that
the purpose of holding cash for cash-rich firms included investing in high-value projects.
6 Further Investigation
Although typical event studies assume that events are firm-specific, COVID-19 as an
event has an economy-wide impact and the TOPIX index has been on a downward
trend since January 2020 (Figure 1). Therefore, the effect of COVID-19 on stock prices
should be reflected not only in the abnormal returns, but also the normal returns, i.e.,
the returns that can be explained by CAPM. This leads us to the following question.
How much of the observed variation in the stock returns over the period of the event
window can be explained by the variation in the abnormal returns and how much by
the variation in the normal returns?
To answer these questions, we construct the following variable.
V Ri =
V ar(ARi)
V ar(ARi) + V ar(NRi)
(4)
where V ar(ARit) and V ar(NRit) are the variance of the abnormal returns and that of
the normal returns for firm i, respectively. V Ri is distributed between 0 and 1, and the
larger the ratio of V ar(ARit) to the variance of observed stock returns for firm i, the
19Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that mi-
nority shareholders’ cash holdings are smaller in countries with weaker investor protection.
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larger V Ri is. We calculate V Ri for each firm i using the data over the entire period.
Figure 3 shows that V Ri between about 0.4 and 1 is distributed almost uniformly,
which implies that different firms have different relative magnitudes of the variance in
their abnormal returns.
We then regressed V Ri on Cash and the industry dummy variables. Table 7 shows
that the estimates of the coefficient on Cash are significantly negative. This result is
consistent with the results in Table 2, suggesting that firms with higher Cash have
smaller V R, and thus a relatively lower share of abnormal return variance in the total
variance of each security’s returns. This is because the higher a firm’s Cash is, the less
volatile its stock return is, as higher Cash can keep the abnormal rate of return from
declining.
Table 8 shows some of the estimates of the coefficients when V R is regressed on
the industry dummy variables, using data for the five largest industries (Top5) and
five smallest industries (Bottom5). We estimated three different equations: the first
equation’s explanatory variables are the industry dummy variables only, the second
equation’s are the industry dummy variables and Cash, and the third equation’s are
the industry dummy variables, Cash, and the interaction terms of industry dummy
variables and Cash. The results are robust regardless of the specification. On the
one hand, the results suggest that the Bottom5 industries are strongly affected by
fluctuations in the market returns; thus, there is a need for economic policies that
support the entire industry because the stock prices of the firms in these industries
strongly reflect the effects of macro shocks. On the other hand, the results suggest
that the Top5 industries are strongly influenced by firm-specific factors; thus, different
support measures are needed for each firm’s attributes rather than for the industry as
a whole.
7 Conclusion
We examine how cash mitigated the adverse COVID-19 shock to firms using the event-
study methodology and financial data from firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
We find that firms with more cash, less debt, and larger scale suffered less from the
pandemic during the entire event window. We also find that the pandemic reduced the
value of future investment opportunities of the firms. It is shown that the variations
reflecting firm-specific factors become relatively smaller as cash holdings increase.
Our results also raise important questions for future research. We show that cash did
not prevent a decline in the value of potential investment opportunities. However, we are
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unable to determine from this result whether the value of the investment opportunity
itself has declined, or whether the investment opportunity still exists but is seen as
difficult to implement because of insufficient funds. In order to solve this problem, we
need indexes of the difficulty for firms in obtaining external financing, as well as data
on the actual amount of investment by firms.
Another issue is the design of optimal insurance against negative shocks caused by
the epidemic. The implication of the results from the paper is that firms that hold cash
can cope to some extent with negative firm-specific shocks, but it is difficult to respond
to negative macro shocks. However, self-insurance, i.e., cash holdings, is not always the
best way to prevent negative firm-specific shocks. This is because a firm’s large cash
holdings in normal times reduce the probability that it will invest in profitable projects.
In fact, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) find that US firms reduced their investment
expenditure and increased cash held after the global crisis. Therefore, there is a need
for a system that provides some degree of insurance against individual corporate shocks.
Appendix
A.1. Google Search for Coronavirus and Recession
Figure A shows the number of Google searches for “coronavirus” in Japanese from
January to April 2020. The first peak in the graph is observed on January 30, reflecting
the WHO declaration of a “Global Health Emergency” on January 30. The second peak
came in late March, when people expected the disease to have a higher probability of
becoming a pandemic, partly because the government had formulated its “Basic Policies
for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control” and partly because the number of infected
people in Japan had begun to rise rapidly, exceeding 100. The word was searched most
often on April 4, when people were waiting for Prime Minister Abe to declare a state
of emergency.
To identify the point at which people began to think that the coronavirus might
have a negative impact on the economy, we also report data for Google searches for
“recession” in Japanese in Figure A. Searches for the word have increased since mid-
February, suggesting that Japanese were beginning to realize around this time that the
coronavirus could have a negative impact on the economy. The first peak in the search
for “recession” is observed on February 28, three days after the first business failure in
Japan following the COVID-19 outbreak.
These results indirectly confirm plausibility of our choice of the event dates. While
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COVID-19 has attracted enormous attention since early February, Japanese have been
aware of the potential negative impact of COVID-19 on the economy since March.
A.2. Industries with Significantly Negative Estimated Coeffi-
cients for Cash
Table A reports the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between industry
dummy and Cash, and those of Cash adjusted by the estimates of the interaction
terms. The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between Cash and MB were
not significant in any of the equations (13) from Table 3 to Table 5. Therefore, we re-
port the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms based on equation (12) in each
table. Because of the large number of industries, we report here only those industries in
which the estimated coefficient was significantly negative. In addition, we also report
the estimated total coefficients of Cash for each industry, adjusted by the estimated
coefficients of the interaction terms. For example, the estimated total coefficient of
Food, −0.1581, is equal to the sum of the one for Cash,0.1660, and the one for the
interaction term, −0.3242. The number in parentheses next to the name of the coeffi-
cient represents the number of firms in that industry. As this table shows, the number
of firms belonging to industries in which the adjusted cash coefficient is significantly
negative is 521 in Table 3, 404 in Table 4, and 84 in Table 5.
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Table 1 Timeline of Key Events Linked to COVID-19 in Japan
Jan. 15: The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare confirmed the first infected person in Japan.
Feb. 1: Government classified COVID-19 as a legally designated infectious disease.
Feb. 13: The first confirmed fatality in Japan was reported.
Government announced the first emergent package to support economy.
Feb. 25: Basic Policies for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control
decided by the Headquarters for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control.
The first business failure in Japan following the COVID-19 outbreak
Mar. 2: Governor of BOJ issued an emergency statement.
Mar. 13: The Diet approved legislation authorizing the Prime Minister to declare a state of emergency.
Apr. 7: The Prime Minister declared a state of emergency covering major city areas such as Tokyo.
Government adopted Emergency Economic Measures for Response to COVID-19.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This table shows the result of a single regression of MB on Cash.The t-statistics(tstat) are based on
White-corrected robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 7 Regression Results: Variance Ratio
Variance Ratio(V R)
(1) (2) (3)
const 0.6069 *** 0.6471 *** 0.6702 ***
tstat 77.2223 51.1703 40.2924
Cash -0.1087 *** -0.1712 ***
tstat -4.9675 -5.1159
Obs 2468 2468 2468
Adj R2 0.4519 0.4579 0.4593
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Cash× Indust NO NO Yes
This table shows the results of regressing V R on Cash and Industry dummy variables, where V R is
calculated by dividing the variance of the abnormal returns (V AR(AR)) by the sum of the variance
of the abnormal returns (V AR(AR)) and the variance of the normal returns (V AR(NR)) (equation
(4) in the text).The t-statistics (tstat) are based on White-corrected robust standard errors. ***, **,
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8 Regression Coefficients for Industry Dummy: Bottom 5 and Top 5
Bottom 5
Table7 (1) Table7 (2) Table7 (3)











Table7 (1) Table7 (2) Table7 (3)
Gas Gas Gas
(0.3543) (0.3220) (0.2907)








This table summarizes the five industries with small industry dummy regression coefficients (Bottom
5) and five industries with large regression coefficients (Top 5) for each regression equation in Table 7.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 Number of Infected Persons in Japan and TOPIX
This figure shows the closing price of TOPIX from January to April 2020 (line, left
axis) and the number of infected persons in Japan (bar graph, right axis).
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Figure 2 CSAR from Jan 6 (average by cash ratio quintile)
This graph shows univariate comparisons of average cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CSAR)
after January 6, 2020, the business day following the last day of the estimation window. Here, the
quintile is sorted based on Cash. The figure presents the average CSAR for Category 1 as the first
quintile (cash-richest group), Category 5 as the fifth quintile (the cash-poorest group), and all firms.
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Figure 3 Histogram of Variance Ratio
This graph shows the distribution of the variance ratio (V R) calculated by dividing the variance of
the abnormal returns (V AR(AR)) by the sum of the variance of the abnormal returns (V AR(AR))
and the variance of the normal returns (V AR(NR)) (equation (4) in the text).
Figure A Number of Searches for “Coronavirus” and “Recession”
This figure summarizes the changes in the number of searches for “Coronavirus” and “Recession” in
Japan. The maximum value for this period is set to 100 as the reference value.
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